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COMMENT
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES:
SOME PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND INTERPRETATION
I. INTRODUcTION

Since his inauguration, President Carter has made a most striking departure from the policies of his Republican predecessors by
elevating human rights to a central position in American foreign
policy. The realpolitik of the Kissinger State Department was perceived by the new President to lack a basic concern for the human
side of international affairs. 1 Accordingly, the Carter Administration
proclaimed early on that "[t]he undertaking to promote human rights
is now an integral part of our foreign policy." 2 The human rights
issue has since been raised in different contexts by various American
officials. 3 The intensity with which human rights violations in other
countries have been attacked has varied, hinging on independent
1 See, e.g., Transcript of Ford-CarterDebate, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1976, at 36,
col. 1: ("Every time Mr. Ford speaks from a position of secrecy in negotiations and
in secret treaties that have been pursued and achieved in supporting dictatorships,
in ignoring human rights, we are weak . . . .") (comments of Mr. Carter). For
an earlier view suggesting general disenchantment on the part of Democrats with
the human rights policies of the Republican Administration, see International Protection of Human Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Organizationsand
Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 220-22
(1973) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
The theoretical relevance of human rights to American foreign policy has best
been expressed by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance:

The human rights issue is really grounded in fundamental values
which lie at the root of the founding of this country. The dignity of the
individual and the protection of those rights is a very sacred right that is
of great importance to Americans. And therefore it is something which
should be of importance to us in our domestic lives and in the conduct of
our foreign policy. It has to be interwoven into the fabric of our foreign
policy, and this we believe can be done.
Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Face the Nation", 76 Dr'T STATE BuLL. 245, 246
(1977).
2 Human Rights: An Important Concern of U.S. Foreign Policy, 76 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 289, 290 (1977) (statement of Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of
State).
3 See, e.g., President Carter's News Conference of Feb. 23, 76 DEP'T STATE
BuLL. 251, 252 (1977); The Challenge to the Economic and Social Council:
Advancing the Quality of Life in All Its Aspects, 76 DE'T STATE Bur,. 494, 495-96
(1977) (address by U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young); Administration Recommends
Senate Approval of Genocide Convention, 76 DEP'T STATE BULL. 676, 677 (1977)
(statement by Warren Christopher).
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considerations of international politics.4 It is clear, however, that
the international human rights issue will remain for some time as
an important consideration in the formulation and evaluation of
American foreign policy.
Given this new emphasis by the United States on human rights
in the world order, 5 the exact scope of those rights should be
examined, for important matters of domestic and international
policy may turn on the answer. On March 17, 1977, President
Carter told representatives of the United Nations that, as a demonstration of his commitment to the realization of human rights ideals,
he would seek approval by the Senate of four U.N.-sponsored
treaties on human rights. 6 These treaties-the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 7 the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; s the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 9
and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
4

The Department of State Bulletin offers a fascinating glimpse at how the
fledgling Carter Administration handled the human rights issue in its foreign policy
pronouncements. After well-publicized attacks were initially directed at specific
human rights violations in other countries, e.g., 76 DEP'T STATE Bur_.. 250 (1977)
(Uganda), human rights statements were considerably muted as a result of adverse
developments abroad, such as the restrictions placed on Americans living in Uganda,
see Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Face the Nation", supra note 1, at 245-46,
and the breakdown in SALT talks with the Soviet Union, see Secretary Vance Visits
Moscow and Western Europe, 76 DEP'T STATE BULL. 389 (1977). Statements on
the subject have since been of a fairly general nature. See, e.g., Human Rights
and Foreign Policy, 76 DEe'T STATE BuLL. 505 (1977) (address by Secretary
Vance).
5It is only since the Second World War, with the development of various
treaties on the subject, that human rights have come to be generally viewed as a
matter for international concern and protection. Previously, customary international
law had afforded protection for human rights only to aliens within a state, and
such rights could be vindicated only through the force or persuasion of the alien's
home country. See, e.g., Luard, The Origins of International Concern Over Human
Rights, in Tm LNTERNATIoNAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN InG s 7-21 (E. Luard ed.
1967); Starr, International Protection of Human Rights and the United Nations
Covenants, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 863, 864 (1967).
OPeace, Arms Control, World Economic Progress, Human Rights: Basic Priorities of U.S. Foreign Policy, 76 DEI"T STATE Br.L. 329, 332 (1977). President
Carter later returned to the U.N. to sign two of the treaties that had not yet been
given such a preliminary indication of approval by the United States. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 6, 1977, at A2, col. 5. Actual ratification by the United States is possible
only after Senate action in accordance with Article IH,section 2 of the Constitution,
providing that treaties may be entered into only "by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate . . . provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."
7 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966) (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
8 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights].
9 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter cited as
Convention on Racial Discrimination].
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-Crime of Genocide 10-contain an exhaustive catalogue of asserted
rights of human beings as individuals and as ethnic, racial, and
national groups."1 The listed "rights" range from a familiar prohibition against cruel punishment 1 2 to the novel right to rest and
leisure, including periodic holidays with pay.13 By his pledge at
the U.N., therefore, the President revealed that he was willing to
give full content to the term "human rights," not only as a matter
of American foreign policy, but also as a matter of international
law binding the United States as a future party to the treaties.
There are several benefits which would follow from American
ratification of these human rights treaties. First, the image of the
United States abroad would be improved by eliminating the "embarrassing contradiction" between America's statements in support
of human rights and its failure to ratify the treaties.1 4 America's
moral position would be so much the stronger, because ratification
might counteract previous attacks on its non-party status.15 Second,
the position of the United States as a party to the treaties would
enable it to influence their interpretation and application. CurTently, the shaping of international human rights in this way is left
to nations "not particularly known for their commitment to libertarian ideals." 16 Third, ratification by the United States would
presumably encourage other nations to accede to and implement the
treaties, thereby expanding "the rule of law on an international
scale." 17 To the extent that human rights violations within a
single state lead to inter-state conflict,' 8 the cause of international
1078 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter cited as
Convention on Genocide].
11 See text accompanying notes 23-92 infra.
12 Covenant on Civil and Political Bights, supra note 7, art. 7, 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) at 53.
13 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural ights, supra note 8, art. 7,
21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 50.
14 Gardner, A Costly Anachronism, 53 A.B.A.J. 907, 908 (1967).
15 See Buergenthal, International Human Rights: U.S. Policy and Priorities, 14
VA. J. INT'L L. 611, 619 (1974); Schroth & Mueller, Racial Discrimination, The
United States and the International Convention, 4 HumAN Brcnrs 171, 203 (1975);
see also Brezhnev Counters West on Civil Rights, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1977, at A3,
col. 1.
16 Buergenthal, supra note 15, at 619. See also Gardner, supra note 14, at 908.
17 See Starr, supra note 5, at 890.
1s See, e.g., International Protection of Human Rights: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 284-85 (1973) (remarks of Prof. Falk); Paust,
Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60 Cowmrr.
L. EEv. 231, 231 (1975); Starr, supra note 5, at 889.
The continuing conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbors, fueled in part
by alleged deprivations of the rights of Palestinians who live within the Jewish
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peace would be advanced by the increased respect for human rights
signified by American accession to the treaties.
Substantial objections have, however, been raised against the
treaties. They have been opposed on the constitutional grounds
that the federal government lacks power under the Constitution to
enter into treaties having human rights content ' 9 and that specific
provisions of the treaties offend substantive articles of the Constitution.20 Beyond the constitutional problems, there are also objections based wholly on policy arguments. The purpose of this
Comment is to consider the human rights treaties from a policy standpoint, leaving the constitutional questions to the commentators who
have covered them so well. 21 A comprehensive policy analysis is
not intended. Rather, one provision will be taken from each treaty
state, is one example of the relationship between human rights and international
peace. See International Protection of Human Rights: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 587 (1973) (statement of Mr. Richardson).
19Proponents of this constitutional argument generally assert that the United
States may not enter into the human rights treaties because they involve (1)
matters solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States, (2) matters
not of international concern, and (3) powers reserved to the states by the Constitution. Guggenheim & Defeis, United States Participationin International Agreements Providing Rights for Women, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1, 22-41 (1976).
Although consideration of this argument is beyond the scope of this Comment, a
review of the literature reveals that the supporters of human rights treaties have a
strong rebuttal in the argument that there is nothing in the Constitution limiting
the treaty power to matters not within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States.
Indeed, except for treaties which codify customary international law, any treaty
will necessarily remove an issue from purely domestic concern. Furthermore, a
limitation on treaty subjects to matters of "international concern" is not spelled out
in the Constitution, and although some cases support the limitation, it is incorrect
to assume that human rights treaties have only domestic effect. Finally, states'
rights should not be considered a limitation on the treaty power, because the treaty
power in a sense represents a delegation of powers from the states to the federal
government that is to be exercised in the treaty situation. Id. See generally,
Buergenthal, supra note 15, at 612-13; Gardner, supra note 14, at 907; Henkin,
The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L. B~v.
1012, 1015-29 (1968); MaeChesney, Should the United States Ratify the Covenants? A Question of Merits, Not of Constitutional Law, 62 A. J. INr'L L. 912
(1968); Starr, supra note 5, at 887-89; Tuttle, Are the "Human Rights" Conventions Really Objectionable?,3 INAr'L LAw. 385 (1969).
20ot is fairly clear that substantive provisions of a treaty may not "authorize
what the Constitution forbids." Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1889). See
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The human rights treaties may be vulnerable
in this respect. Article 4 of the Convention on Racial Discrimination, for example,
prohibits the dissemination of certain ideas; this provision clearly contravenes the
first amendment. See Bitker, The Constitutionality of International Agreements on
Human Rights, 12 SANTA CLARA LAw. 279, 288 (1975). Even if certain treaty
provisions are constitutionally invalid, however, the United States may still ratify
the treaties without committing itself to violate the Constitution, simply by fashioning appropriate reservations as to those provisions. Id. 287-88. See text accompanying notes 204-12 infra. An entire treaty need not be rejected because of one
section.
21
See notes 19-20 supra.
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and assessed in light of the perceived interests of the United States
and the world community. Of course, to the extent that other
provisions of a given treaty are similar to the selected provision in
content, impact or history, the present analysis is more generally
applicable. The provisions discussed have been selected for their
suggestiveness in relation to the broad problems that surround each
of the human rights treaties. The policy assessment undertaken in
this Comment is therefore intended to serve as a helpful beginning
in deciding whether American accession to the treaties is truly a
wise goal. Because the treaties are not lacking in internal ambiguities, basic methods of treaty interpretation, such as consideration of
the context of the agreement and the treaty's objects and purposes,
as well as reference to the preparatory work (travaux prdparatoires),
will be brought to bear on the subject.22 Before particular provisions are considered, however, a review of the general structure and
provisions of the four treaties would be useful.
II. THE

TREATIES IN GENERAL

A. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 23
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and opened
for signature, ratification, and accession by states on December 16,
1966. It had been drafted by various groups and subgroups within
the U.N. over a period exceeding ten years and was contemplated
to be part of an international bill of rights supplementing the
general purposes and structure of the United Nations as laid out in
the U.N. Charter. 24 The Covenant entered into force on March
23, 1976, three months after deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of
ratification by Czechoslovakia z
22 See Hassan, The International Covenants on Human Rights: An Approach
to Interpretation, 19 BUFF. L. REV. 35, 37-41 (1969).

2321 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966)
into force Mar. 23, 1976).

(entered

24 Schwelb, Entry Into Force of the International Covenants on Human Rights
and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights, 70 Am. J. INT'L L. 511, 511-12 (1976).

25 Id. 512. Ratification of, or accession to, the human rights treaties is to be
accomplished in accordance with the domestic law of the ratifying state; for the
United States, this entails compliance with Article II, section 2 of the Constitution.
See note 6 supra. The Secretary-General of the United Nations performs a depositary function with respect to instruments of ratification or accession.

Each of the

human rights treaties entered into force only after a certain number of such instruments had been deposited with the Secretary-General. See, e.g., Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, supra note 7, arts. 48-49, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16)
at 58.
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The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights seeks to bind
states-parties to the observance of various rights enumerated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 2 6 but recognized there
only as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations." 27 Thus, the Covenant establishes positive obligations of
states-parties with respect to civil and political rights, and noncompliance with these duties is deemed to be a violation of international
law.28 The basic obligations of states-parties are set forth in article
2 as follows:
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized
in the present Covenant ....
2. [E]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes . . . to adopt such legislative or other

effect to the rights
measures as may be necessary to give
29
recognized in the present Covenant.
The third paragraph of article 2 compels states-parties to ensure
an effective remedy, including means of adjudication and enforcement, to persons whose rights under the Covenant have been
3 0

violated.

26G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71-77 (1948). The Declaration was
seen as the first, non-binding part of an international bill of rights, with binding
covenants and measures of implementation to follow. As stated by Eleanor Roosevelt, then Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and a representative of
the United States in the General Assembly:
[The Universal Declaration of Human Rights] is not a treaty; it is not an
international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a statement
of law or of legal obligation. It is a declaration of basic principles of
human rights and freedoms . . . to serve as a common standard of
achievement for all peoples of all nations.
5 M. WmHTEmAN, DIGEsT OF INTE wATONAL LA&W
2

243 (1965).

7Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 26, preamble, G.A. Res.
217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 72.
2
s States-parties to a treaty are bound by the rule of customary international
law, pacta sunt servanda; that is, treaties must be observed. N. LaEcn, C. OLrvER
& J. SwEENEY, TrE INTENAmToNAL LE_:AL SYsTmm 931 (1973) [hereinafter cited

as LEEcH].
29

Article 4(1) provides, however, that "[iln time of public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation," states-parties may "take measures derogating from
their obligations under the . . . Covenant to the extent strictly required by the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra
exigencies of the situation ......
note 9, art. 4, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 53. Such measures are themselves limited by the Covenant, however, and derogation from certain provisions
is forbidden. Id.
30Id. art. 2, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 53. The Covenant, dealing
as it does predominantly with the political rights of individuals vis-d-vis the state,
imposes direct obligations in regard to those rights only on the state as such.
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The substantive rights guaranteed by the Covenant include
many rights analogous or identical to those guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. For example, it is provided that no
one shall be subjected to "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment"; al that slavery is prohibited; 32 that no one shall
be subject to "arbitrary arrest or detention," with trial or release to
follow within a reasonable time after a valid arrest; a and that any
accused person shall have the right to examine witnesses against
him and shall not be compelled to incriminate himself. 3 4 In addition, freedom of movement,m freedom of religion,3 6 the right of
peaceful assembly 3 7 and the right to equal protection of the law 3s
are all recognized and guaranteed. Other rights mentioned in the
Covenant are not so familiar as a matter of American constitutional
law. The Covenant guarantees the right of all peoples to selfdetermination 3 9 Persons sentenced to death have the right to
seek pardon or commutation of the sentence, and the death penalty
40
is not to be imposed on individuals under eighteen years of age.
States-parties are to ensure "equality of rights and responsibilities
of spouses as to marriage," 41 and every child is given the right to
acquire a nationality. 42 On the whole, however, the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights represents an international codification
of rights already recognized under Anglo-American law.
Article 28 establishes a Human Rights Committee to oversee
implementation of the substantive provisions of the Covenant. The
Committee consists of eighteen members "of high moral character
Thus, the remedy called for by article 2 is to be provided to an aggrieved person
"notwithstanding that the violation of rights has been committed by persons acting
in an offlicial capacity." Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7, art.
2(3)(a), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 53 (emphasis supplied). Cf. E.W.
VERDAc, THE CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION IN INrERNATIoNAL LAw 166 (1973)
("[T]he international endeavours to protect human rights are aimed at the attainment of justice in the relations between community and individual, i.e. between

States and those who are subjected to their jurisdiction.").
3
l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7, art. 7, 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) at 53.

Id. art. 8, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 54.
3SId. art. 9, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 54.
32

34Id. art. 14, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 54.
35 Id. art. 12, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 54.
36Id. art. 18, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 55.

37 Id. art. 21, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 55.
38id. art. 26, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 55-56.
39Id. art. 1, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 53.
40 Id. art. 6, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 53.

41 Id. art. 23, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 55.
42 Id. art. 24, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 55.
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and recognized competence in the field of human rights." 43 The
members of the Committee are nominated and elected by statesparties with an eye toward achieving an "equitable geographical
distribution of membership" and the "representation of the different forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems." 4 Although membership on the Committee is limited to citizens of states
that have ratified the Covenant, those persons elected serve in an
individual capacity and not as representatives of any particular state.
The chief function of the Committee is to review periodic reports,
submitted by states-parties pursuant to article 40, on measures
adopted to effectuate the Covenant. The Committee is to transmit
its own reports and general comments on these attempts to implement the Covenant to states-parties and, at its discretion, to the
Economic and Social Council.4 5 There is also a procedure whereby
the Committee will consider complaints by one party against another concerning implementation of the Covenant, provided both
parties have recognized the competence of the Committee in this
regard and the Committee has ascertained that all available domestic
remedies have been exhausted or unreasonably delayed.40 In such
a situation, an amicable solution to the dispute is to be reached
or of
through the intercession of the good offices of the Committee
47
it.
by
appointed
Commission
Conciliation
hoc
ad
an
B. The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights
The International Covenant On Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights 48 was adopted by the General Assembly on December 16,
1966 as the second step in the U.N.'s attempt to construct an effective international bill of rights. The Covenant entered into force
on January 3, 1976 following the deposit of the thirty-fifth instruId. art. 28, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 56.
44 d.art. 31, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 56.
45 Id.art. 40, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 57.
43

46
47

Id. art. 41, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 57.

There is also an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), which establishes a procedure for the handling
of complaints by individuals under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The Human Rights Committee will consider only those petitions which originate in
states that are parties to the Protocol, and will forward its views after consideration
is given to the views of both the state and the individual concerned. See Schwelb,
supra note 24, at 514-15.
4821 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered
into force Jan. 3,1976).
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ment of ratification by Jamaica. Article 2 sets out the broad legal
obligation imposed on states-parties by the Covenant:
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps . . . to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant
particularly the adopby all appropriate means, including
49
tion of legislative measures.
A basic difference between the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is
thus immediately apparent, for the latter imposes present obligations under international law, while the former recognizes that the
stage of economic development of a particular state-party may
impede the implementation of some of the rights proclaimed
therein.
This difference between the two Covenants is understandable,
because many economic, social, and cultural rights are resourceoriented in nature. These rights include the right to work; 50 the
right to "just and favourable conditions of work" including rest,
leisure, and periodic holidays with pay; 51 the right to social
security; 52 the right to "continuous improvement of living conditions"; 53 and the right to education." Other rights recognized by
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that are
perhaps not dependent on the economic development of the state,
though still novel in a bill of rights of the American variety, include
49 Id. art. 2, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 49.
The nature of many of
the rights in the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is such that
their full enforcement will inevitably involve the imposition of obligations on private
groups within states that have acceded to the Covenant. For example, the right
to just and favorable conditions of work would be nugatory if it did not affect
private employers within a given state-party. Ratification of the Covenant would
not, however, result in the immediate imposition of obligations on citizens of the
ratifying state because (1), as discussed in the text, the Covenant itself provides

that the rights will be achieved progressively depending on the economic development of the particular state; and (2) the Covenant was not intended to be selfexecuting, and therefore domestic legislation would be necessary to implement the
treaty provisions within a state-party. Schwelb, supra note 24, at 516. See Sei
Fuiii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).

50 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 8, art. 6, 21
U.N. GAOl:, Supp. (No. 16) at 50.

51Id. art. 7, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 50.
52 Id. art. 9, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 50.
53 Id. art. 11, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 50.
64Id. art. 13, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 51.

1978]

THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES

the right to form and join trade unions 55 and the right to "take
part in cultural life." 51
The jurisdiction to oversee implementation of the Covenant is
vested in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations,
which is to receive periodic reports from states-parties concerning
efforts to implement the Covenant.5 7 The Council, acting on these
reports in conjunction with its Commission on Human Rights, may
issue recommendations to the General Assembly or to specialized
agencies of the U.N. as a means of furthering compliance with
the Covenant.
C. The International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
The International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination 58 was adopted by the General Assembly on March 7, 1966 and entered into force on January 4, 1969.
Simply stated, it represents "the most comprehensive and unambiguous codification in treaty form of the idea of the equality of
races." 19 To give full force to this idea, the Convention defines
"racial discrimination" broadly to include "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race ...

which has the pur-

pose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment
or exercise ... of human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . in

public life." 60 The Convention requires that states-parties condemn such discrimination and "undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating [it] in all
its forms . ..." ,- In particular, states-parties to the Convention

are not to engage in any act of racial discrimination nor to sponsor,
defend or support racial discrimination by any persons or organizations. Indeed, racial discrimination by private persons or organizations is to be prohibited.62 Racial segregation and apartheid are
55Id. art. 8, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 50.
56Id. art. 15, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 51.
57Id. art. 16, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 51.
58 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).

59 Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 15 INr'L & ComP. L.Q. 996, 1057 (1966).
60 Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 9, art. 1, 660 U.N.T.S. at
216. There is, however, an exception to the definition of racial discrimination for
"[sipecial measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement
of certain racial or ethnic groups," in the nature of affirmative action programs in
the United States. Id. art. 1(4), 660 U.N.T.S. at 216.
61 Id. art. 2, 660 U.N.T.S. at 216, 218.
62 See id., 660 U.N.T.S. at 218.
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expressly forbidden.6 3 Under article 5, states-parties agree to prohibit racial discrimination in the enjoyment of a number of civil
and economic rights ranging from the right to own property to
the right to social security and education. Furthermore, in a provision clearly presenting constitutional problems for the United
States, states-parties are bound to "declare an offence punishable by
law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred
"*34

Measures for the implementation of the Convention include
periodic reporting by parties to a Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, 65 a procedure for interstate complaints to
the Committee concerning noncompliance with the Convention, 6
as well as a procedure for handling complaints of non-compliance
by individuals against a state which has recognized the competence
of the Committee to mediate in such a case.6 7 Article 22 of the
Convention further provides that any dispute between states-parties
that has not been settled by negotiation or through the above procedures shall be referred to the International Court of Justice for
decision at the request of any of the disputants.65
The enforcement mechanisms under the Convention on Racial
Discrimination are clearly more far-reaching, and potentially more
effective, than those set forth in either of the two Covenants already
discussed. 9 The latter two treaties contain no provision of general
applicability concerning interstate complaints,7" and no provision at
all relating to complaints by individuals.71 Moreover, the Conven63 Id.art. 3, 660 U.N.T.S. at 218.
64 Id. art. 4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220.
65 Id. art. 9, 660 U.N.T.S. at 224, 226.
6 Id. arts. 11-13, 660 U.N.T.S. at 226, 228, 230. The competence of the
Committee to consider inter-state complaints does not depend on its recognition by
the disputing parties, unlike the procedure for inter-state complaints under the

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
67 Id. art. 14, 660 U.N.T.S. at 230, 232.
68

Id. art. 22, 660 U.N.T.S. at 236, 238.

69 See text accompanying notes 43-47, 57 supra.
70
But cf. text accompanying notes 46-47 supra (Covenant on Civil and Political
Bights provides for inter-state complaint settlement in limited situation where both

parties recognize competence of the Human Rights Committee in this respect).
71 The Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 59, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23,

1976), which provides for the handling of complaints by individuals against statesparties, is a treaty in its own right. In effect, it allows states to elect by ratification
or failure to ratify whether they will be answerable to individuals for national
actions that are violative of the Covenant. See note 47 supra. The Optional
Protocol has not in any case had a widespread effect; as of June 1, 1976, there
were only fourteen nations that had ratified the Protocol, as compared with 37
states-parties that had ratified the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights itself.
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tion's establishment of jurisdiction in the International Court of
Justice, a provision that is lacking in either Covenant, presents the
possibility for binding judicial resolution on an international level
of disputes otherwise unresolved.7 2
D. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide 7a was adopted by the General Assembly on
December 9, 1948 and entered into force on January 12, 1951.
With the memory of Hitler's genocidal atrocities still fresh in the
world's conscience, the original parties to the Convention desired
to "confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or
in time of war, is a crime under international law which they
[undertook] to prevent and to punish." 74 Genocide is defined in
the Convention as any of several acts, such as murder or the causation of serious bodily or mental harm, committed "with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such." 75 Persons committing genocide, or certain related
acts, are to be punished regardless of their official position in the
country where the act occurs. 70
As one means of implementing the Convention, any state-party
to the Convention on Genocide may call upon organs of the United
Nations to act pursuant to Charter powers in order to prevent or
suppress genocidal acts.7 7

Such powers include the ability of the

General Assembly to make recommendations "for the peaceful adjustment of any situation... deem[ed] likely to impair the general
welfare or friendly relations among nations," 78 and the power of
the Security Council to determine the existence of a threat to the
peace and to take appropriate measures, including armed force, to
79 Furthermaintain or restore international peace and security.
more, disputes between states-parties concerning interpretation or
72Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, [1970]
U.N.Y.B. 1013, 1018, provides that the decision of the Court "has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case' (emphasis
supplied).

73 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
74 Convention on Genocide, supra note 10, art. I, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
75 Id. art. IL 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
78 Id. art. IV, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
77 Id. art. VIM, 78 U.N.T.S. at 282.
7s U.N. CaARrM art. 14. The General Assembly's recommendations are not
binding as such on any state, but they may bear the moral force of world opinion.
79 Id. arts. 39-42.
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compliance may be submitted to the International Court of Justice
at the request of any of the disputants8 0
E. The Problem of Enforcement
As indicated by the general review of the treaties, the measures
for implementation are not particularly effective. "The reluctance
of states to accept third party decisionmaking for resolving international controversies and conflicts is at the root of this enforcement
issue." 8"The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the CoveL
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights rely primarily on a
system of reporting by states-parties as a means of overseeing compliance with their provisions; yet the U.N. bodies that receive those
reports are limited to giving their views on the reports' contents
to the states in question. These bodies may not even initiate inquiries into alleged violations of the Covenants. 2 Furthermore,
although the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does provide
for the hearing of inter-state complaints by the Human Rights Committee in cases where the states have consented to such a hearing,
the Committee's final report is to relate only to the facts whether
or not the parties themselves have been able to work out a
satisfactory resolution of the dispute.8 3 Even when the inter-state
complaint has been referred to an ad hoc Conciliation Commission
80 Convention on Genocide, supra note 10, art. IX, 78 U.N.T.S. at 282.

This

provision for jurisdiction in the International Court of Justice is again an improvement, in terms of the binding nature of any settlement, over the non-judicial
methods of implementation contained in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See text accompanying
notes 69, 72 supra. Article VII of the Convention on Genocide provides that geno-

cide and related acts shall not be considered political crimes for the purposes of
extradition, thereby rendering inapplicable the general exception to extradition of
suspected criminals as between states having a mutual extradition treaty for those
who have committed political crimes. See generally LFcH, supra note 28, at 281-82.
81 Nanda, Implementation of Human Rights by the United Nations and Regional
Organizations, 21 DE PAuL L. Bxv. 307, 309 (1971).

For general discussion of

various methods of implementation of the human rights treaties, see Buergenthal,
Implementing the U.N. Racial Convention, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 187 (1977); Humphrey, The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation, 17 WM. &
MaY L. REv. 527, 536-40 (1976); Schwelb, International Measures of Implemetation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and of the
Optional Protocol, 12 Tux. INT.L.J. 141 (1977); Starr, supra note 5, at 873-74.
82 Nanda, supra note 81, at 313. Furthermore, the ability of the Economic

and Social Council to make recommendations to the General Assembly or to the
specialized agencies established by the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, see text accompanying notes 57-58 supra, appears to be directed toward
aiding those agencies to take positive steps of a general nature in assisting statesparties to implement that Covenant, and not towards imposing sanctions for non-

compliance. See Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 8,
arts. 21-22, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 52.

83 Nanda, supra note 81, at 318.
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by the Human Rights Committee, the report of that Commission,
which may embody recommendations for an amicable solution in
keeping with international law, as well as findings of fact, need not
be accepted by the disputing states.84
The Conventions on Racial Discrimination and Genocide contain enforcement provisions which on their face are stronger than
those in either of the Covenants. Thus, the Convention on Racial
Discrimination establishes jurisdiction in the Human Rights Committee, regardless of the consent of states to such jurisdiction, to
hear inter-state complaints under that Convention. Again, however, the Committee's final report in such cases is to contain only
findings of fact and recommendations for an amicable solution; the
disputing states remain free to reject those recommendations.11
Moreover, the provision in the Convention on Racial Discrimination concerning complaints by individuals makes the hearing of
such complaints dependent on the consent of the state that is the
object of the complaint. Finally, even the International Court of
Justice's ultimate jurisdiction over inter-state disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of the Conventions on Racial Discrimination and Genocide is weakened by the fact that such jurisdiction
is subject to contrary reservation by any state upon ratifying the
treaties.8 6 Additionally, in the current state of international law, a
judgment by the International Court of Justice does not as a prac87
tical matter always compel obedience by the states in question.
In light of the feeble enforcement system behind the human
rights treaties, it might be argued that the United States may safely
accede to the treaties, and thereby gain the advantages of such a
step,8 8 without incurring any real obligations that are enforceable
under international law, regardless of what the theoretical policy
objections may be. Perhaps the simplest answer to this argument
84 Id.
8

5Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 9, arts. 13(1) & (2), 66a)

U.N.T.S. at 230.
86 See notes 204-10 infra and accompanying text.
87Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter provides that "[e]ach Member of theUnited Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court
of Justice in any case to which it is a party." Although judgments of the International Court of Justice have been complied with in the great majority of cases,

there have been instances, notably the Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom vo
Albania), [1949] LCJ. 4, in which a party has ignored an adverse judgment with
impunity. In no such case has recourse been had by the prevailing party to the,
U.N. Security Council to "decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the
judgment." U.N. CEaAnTmR art. 94, ff2. The measures to be taken at such point
are within the sole discretion of the Security Council. See LExcH, supra note 28,
at 85.
88 See text accompanying notes 14-18 supra.
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is that it has not satisfied opponents of the treaties who object to
the idea of the United States' being a party to the treaties undei
any circumstances. s9 Moreover, the United States might indeed be
impelled to adhere to the spirit, if not the letter, of those treaties
upon ratifying them. First, ratification would represent a moral
commitment by the United States to implement the treaties. Ratification without intent to implement the treaties might well be
seen by the world community as a cynical attempt on the part of
the United States to use solemn international agreements solely for
immediate propaganda gains. Second, because treaties in general
are a part of the "supreme Law of the Land," 90 ratification of the
human rights treaties would encourage legislators to take steps in
furtherance of such supreme law.9 ' Thus, although the human
rights treaties are not self-executing-that is, their simple ratification without more does not give them domestic effect 9 2-their ratification would create an impetus towards the passage of implementing
legislation, which would be enforceable by domestic means. Finally,
although the present lack of an effective international enforcement
mechanism may well enable any state callously to disregard its international human rights obligations, the desideratum in this area is
to foster respect for the rule of law by acceding only to treaties
which the United States intends to comply with to the fullest. It
therefore is in the interest of this nation to ratify the treaties only
if a good faith effort at compliance is intended-or, in other words,
it appears that the United States ought not ratify the human rights
treaties without intending and then attempting to effecuate their
provisions. An understanding of the policy issues involved in ratification is therefore necessary before such a commitment is made.
III. SELECTED PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND INTERPRETATION

A. The Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights
and the Right of Self-Determination
Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights provides as follows:
89

See, e.g., Haight, Human Rights Covenants, 62 Am. Soc. hrr'L L. Poc. 96,
101 (1968); Raymond, Genocide: An Unconstitutional Human Rights Convention?,
12 SAtA CLrAP LAw. 294, 315 (1972).
90 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
9' Cf. Schroth & Mueller, supra note 15, at 181 (inability to live up to requirements of Convention on Racial Discrimination because of insufficient federal power
should not be a cause of embarrassment in the future, because treaties are supreme
law of the land and Congressional power to enforce thirteenth amendment has not
been exploited to full potential).
92 See note 49 supra; Leech, supra note 28, at 1025-26.
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1. All peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of
Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote
the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall
respect that right . ... 93
1. The Interest of the United States
In considering whether to ratify the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, it is important to consider the contemplated scope
of the "right" of self-determination, and the definition of the
"'peoples" to whom it applies. The United States clearly has a
strong interest in maintaining its integrity as a nation as currently
constituted, and thus any proposed international legal norm designed to erode this integrity may be viewed as fundamentally
unacceptable. The stability of national entities is an essential element in a peaceful world order and therefore the general principle
is "that states want to preserve their territorial integrity, and exceptions to that rule are very rare." 9
Self-preservation, the Supreme Court has recognized, is "the
ultimate value of any society." 95 The Civil War, the greatest crisis
in American history, is the most obvious testimony to the United
States' unequivocal opposition to any fragmentation of the Republic. If the United States is to accede to the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, it must be clear that the right of peoples to
self-determination does not conflict with a proper interest in national integrity. As stated by one commentator, who feared an
open-ended meaning of "peoples" and of the self-determination
right:
If we wish to promote revolutions around the world,
[recognition of a right of self-determination] would be one
way of doing it. A consequence of this, however, might
well be the promotion by outside groups of revolutions in
93 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7, art. 1, 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) at 52.
UNT
STATis, AND Worm CovrHmuaTy
94 V. v, DYxE, HUmAN IGH-rs, T

85 (1970).
95 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 128 (1959), quoting Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
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this country. . . If we are now to admit that any group
that can somehow identify itself as a "people" has the right
to secede, this country might well fall apart. 6
The validity of such fears hinges, however, on the precise
meaning of the terms "peoples" and "self-determination" in article 1,
as intended by the Covenant's drafters and as carried into practice by
political bodies of the United Nations.91 In this context, three
concepts of self-determination may be relevant: (1) the right of a
colonial country to gain its independence from the colonial power,
(2) the right of an independent nation to maintain its independence against outside encroachment, and (3) the right of an ethnic
or other minority within a recognized national unit to gain some
degree of autonomy. 98 Similarly, "peoples" as used in article 1
might mean either (1) groups predominant in recognized political
areas which have historically been independent; or (2) ethnic or
other minorities within a political unit, regardless of whether such
minorities have historically been independent.9 9 If article 1 were
taken to subsume the broadest concepts of self-determination and
peoples mentioned above, the fear that the Covenant threatens
national integrity would be well-founded, for those concepts in
essence would allow any identifiable minority to secede from larger
political units, no matter how great a claim to historical legitimacy
those units might have. To determine what interpretation should
be given to the ambiguous words used in the Covenant, it is necessary to examine the travaux prdparatoires in order to discern the
100
intent of the drafters.
96 Haight, Human Rights Covenants, 62 Am. Soc. IN'L L. Paoc. 96, 98 (1968).
See V. vA_ Dy=, supra note 94, at 86; Luard, Promotion of Human Rights by
U.N. Political Bodies, in Tim INTERNATiONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN Ricrrs 132,
140-41 (E. Luard ed. 1967).
97
Because the provision for a right of self-determination precedes the imposition of obligations on states-parties in article 2, the self-determination right is
arguably not governed by the later article and so is not binding on parties to the
Covenant. Haight, supra note 96, at 115 (comments of Mr. Schwelb). This view
appears to be incorrect; the travaux pr~paratoiresreveal a desire on the part of the
drafters to list the right of self-determination first simply because it was viewed as
the "corner-stone of the whole edifice of human rights." 6 U.N. GAOR, C. 3 (397th
mtg.) 299, U.N. Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 397 (1952) (remarks of Mr. Mufti).
98 See 8 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4 (253d mtg.) 6-7, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 253
(.1952) (remarks of Mr. Hoare); V. v . D=xE, supra note 94, at 77-85. Another
conception of the right to self-determination, not relevant to a consideration of the
topic on an international plane, is the right of nationals within a state to choose
their own form of government. V. vAN D=an, supra note 94, at 79-81.
99
See R. HIGGINs, TIrE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
PoLrrICAL ORGANS OF TIE U=NTED NATIONS 104 (1963).
100 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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2. The Travaux and Other Sources
The earliest discussions in the United Nations on the right of
self-determination make clear that many of the participating states
were concerned solely with colonial conditions then prevailing, in
much of the world.1' 1 Indeed, so great was this concern that some
desired to omit reference to the right as a guarantee for the continued sovereignty of existing, non-colonial nations. Thus, an
initial draft resolution presented to the Commission on Human
Rights by the Soviet Union, which formed the basis for subsequent
discussion, recognized the right to national self-determination and
provided only that "States responsible for the administration of
Non-Self-Governing Territoriesshall promote the fulfillment of this
right ....,"

102

The Soviet representative, in explaining the draft,

referred to "outworn ideas of colonialism" that were0 3in natural
opposition to the emerging right of self-determination.
The matter of rights of national minorities was raised, however, in two ways. First, the Soviet working draft provided in a
separate paragraph that "[t]he State shall ensure to national minorities the right to use their native tongue and to have their national
schools, libraries, museums and other cultural and educational institutions." 104 The Soviet representative stated that this paragraph
was designed to ensure the opportunity for cultural development
so that a "people" (national minority) might become ready to
exercise the right of self-determination. 1 5 A related proposal by
Yugoslavia provided that the right of self-determination
includes the right of every person to participate, with all
the members of a group inhabiting a compact territory, to
which he belongs ethnically, culturally, historically or
otherwise, in the free exercise of its right to self-determination, including the right to secede and to establish a politically and economically independent State .

.

. .106

Both the Soviet and Yugoslav proposals failed to win the
approval of the Commission on Human Rights, however, and so
101

See 6 U.N. GAOR, C. 3 (400th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 400 (1952).
U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/L. 21 (1952) (emphasis

1028

supplied).

o3 Id. (254th mtg.) 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 254 (1952).

104 Id., U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/L. 21 (1952).
1o5 Id.
106Id.,

(254th mtg.) 5-6, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 254 (1952).
U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/L. 22 (1952)

(emphasis supplied).

This pro-

posal was later amended to omit specific reference to a right of secession. It was
still construed, however, to encompass an implied right of secession. Id. (261st
mtg.), U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 261 (1952).
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were never even raised in a body of larger representation. 10 7 In
opposing the Soviet minorities provision, the representative of Chile
noted that it "presented grave problems particularly in the case of
under-populated countries which had embarked on a policy of largescale immigration.... [S]uch a provision would retard the process
of assimilation of immigrants into the community and would prevent the formation of a homogeneous society." 108 The French
representative pointed out that, in view of the encouragement it
would likely give to irredentist movements within existing nations,
the Soviet proposal "would tend to weaken the principle of selfdetermination by discouraging States from ratifying the covenant." 109 Lebanon and India indicated that the subject of minorities in the Soviet draft was simply irrelevant.1 10
The Yugoslav proposal was similarly opposed because of its
potential for disrupting national unity, even after it had been
The
amended to omit specific reference to acts of secession.,
Greek representative stated that it would be dangerous to include
wording which could be interpreted to allow "subversive activities." 112 The representative from Australia remarked:
Such an article could hardly be inserted in a covenant
which was intended to have the force of law if the article
itself authorized action that was unlawful. As a matter of
historical necessity many peoples had achieved their independence by revolutionary or subversive means and it
might be that historical necessity would dictate the employment of similar means in some extreme cases in the future,
but such a course of action could not be the subject of
legal prescription.18
The second way in which the minorities question arose was in
the clash between Third World countries and the colonial powers
of Western Europe concerning the situations in which the right to
self-determination could be invoked. As noted, the primary focus
10 7 For a Lprocedural history of the drafting of the article on self-determination

up to its consideration by the General Assembly, see 10 U.N. GAOR, Draft
Covenants Annotation 5-20, U.N. Doe. A/2929 (1955).
1088 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4 (257th mtg.) 3, U.N. Doe. E/CN. 4/SR. 257
(1952) (emphasis supplied).
109 Id. at 4.
110 Id. at 8, 10. See id. (259th mtg.) 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 259 (view
of Uruguay that it was not appropriate to deal with the question of minorities in
connection with self-determination).
Ill See note 116 supra.
1128 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4 (261st mtg.) 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 261 (1952).
113 Id. 11 (emphasis supplied).
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of the Soviet working draft in the Commission on Human Rights
was on the promotion of the right by colonial powers "responsible
for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories." The
guarantee of such a right for established nations against foreign
intervention was not even mentioned. The Western European
countries naturally resisted such a frontal assault on their colonial
holdings, combined with lopsided duties imposed on them with
regard to the right of self-determination. Instead, the colonial
powers asserted that the right of self-determination should logically
extend to a broader category of peoples, including identifiable
groups having common ethnic or other backgrounds. France, for
one, was unwilling to subscribe to the limited Soviet proposal
because some states not responsible for non-self-governing territories
"had among their populations heterogeneous elements that did not
enjoy equal individual or collective rights with other national
groups." 114 In reply to the Indian representative's assertion that
the questions of minorities and self-determination should not be
confused, the Belgian representative stated his belief that minorities
properly defined should be able to aspire to self-government.1la A
meaning given in this way to the right of self-determination, he
believed, would put an end to such "arbitrary and opportunistic
interpretations" as had been used by the Soviet Union in the colonial
context.11 6
The early debates on the right of self determination are thus
replete with elements of irony. The Soviet Union argued for a
limited right of self-determination so that the article would represent a resounding condemnation of colonialism. In later years a
broader conception of the right might have been useful in fostering
separatist movements with a Marxist orientation. The Western
European countries desired a broader definition including the recogU.N. ESCOR, CN. 4 (255th mtg.) 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 255
See V. vAw DYin, supra note 94, at 86.
115 8 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4 (253d mtg.) 14, U.N. Doe. E/CN. 4/SR. 253
(1952).
116 Id. (254th mtg.) 6, U.N. Doe. E/CN. 4/SR. 254. In rejoinder, Lebanon
made the significant point that
the Belgian representative had given the impression that the main purpose
of the right to self-determination was to promote that right in relation to
minorities within countries. That was the aspect of the question which
1148

(1952).

most closely affected European countries . . . nevertheless, the countries

which had raised the question in the General Assembly were not European.
It was therefore understandable that the pivot of the whole problem was
not the position of minorities, but that of countries that had lost their
independence as a result of aggression. The main issue was that of the
Non-Self-Governing Territories ....
Id. 9.
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nition of a right to self-determination for national minorities, so as
to soften the anticolonial impact of the article. In fact, the recognition of such a right would subsequently have proven to be embarrassing for such Western nations as Spain, Great Britain and Canada,
which have significant and vocal separatist movements.
In the end, neither the Western nor the Soviet position prevailed. Most of the states participating in the discussions of the
Commission clearly disfavored a definition of peoples or conception
17
of self-determination that reached national minorities of any sort.
Furthermore, the Soviet proposal limiting the impact of article 1 to
colonial situations yielded to an amendment by the United States
requiring all states to promote the right of self-determination within
extended territories which historically were not a part of the state
promoting the right and to respect the maintenance of that right
in other states."18 As so amended, article 1 was adopted by the
Commission on Human Rights 119 and sent to the General Assembly.
There the Third Committee, following a discussion which reemphasized the roots of the right of self-determination in the colonial
problem and the irrelevance of minorities and secessionist activities
to the concept,120 reported out an article 1 with no substantive
changes from the Commission's version and substantially as it appears today.
The interpretation of the right of peoples to self-determination
as negating any right of minorities to secede is well-supported by
commentators who have worked more from common sense than
from the travaux prdparatoires. Several have stressed the historical
context of the development of the right, concluding that it was
formulated in response to the territorial expansion of colonial
117 See text accompanying notes 108-13 supra. See also 8 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4
(Memorandum by Secretary-General) 19, U.N. Doe. E/CN. 4/649 (1952).
118 See id. (259th mtg.), U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 259.
119 As reported by the Commission on Human Rights, article 1 read as follows:
1. All peoples and all nations shall have the right of self-determination, namely, the right freely to determine their political, economic, social

and cultural status.
2. All States, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories and those controlling in
whatsoever manner the exercise of that right by another people, shall
promote the realization of that right in all their territories, and shall
respect the maintenance of that right in other States ....

14 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 4) 10-11, U.N. Doe. E/CN. 4/669 (1952).
120 10 U.N. GAOR, Report of Third Comm. I Annexes (Agenda Item) 30 U.N.
Doe. A/3077 (1955). See 6 U.N. GAOR, C. 3 (399th mtg.) 311, U.N. Doc.
A/C. 3/SR. 399 (1952)

(statement by Indian representative that the right could

not be invoked to "destroy the unity of a nation or to impede the creation of such
unity").
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powers. 121 Moreover, abstract analyses of the right to self-determination have led to the widely accepted proposition that self-determinadon also refers to "the right of the majority within a generally
accepted political unit to the exercise of power .... ," 122 In this
view, "it is necessary to start with stable boundaries and to permit
political change within them," for otherwise "all is in flux, and
there is no constant factor at all; [and] to withdraw this proviso
would encourage impermissible use of force across state boundaries,
an outcome which the United Nations can hardly encourage ... ," 12
It is apparent from the foregoing examination of the travaux,
as well as of the predominant views of commentators, that the
United States can have little policy objection to article 1 of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The right of self-determination does not include the right of ethnic or other minorities to
secede from recognized political units. The right was intended
rather to preserve the sovereignty of existing states, whether currently dependent or independent. There is therefore no threat to
the justifiable interest of the United States in self-preservation or
national integrity.
B. The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
and the Right to Periodic Holidays with Pay
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights provides as follows:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular:
(d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working
hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays.1 4
121 See, e.g., R. IGGiNs, supra note 99, at 90-106; V. vAN DYi, supra note
94, at 86-87; Haight, supra note 96, at 105 (comments of Mr. Carey).
122 R. HGiGns, supra note 99, at 105 (emphasis supplied).
123 Id. 104. See V. vAN D=xi, supra note 94, at 88.
The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66-67, U.N. Doe. A/4684
(1960), lends further support for this conclusion by its provision in paragraph &
that "[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity
and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations." See generally Declaration on
Principles of International Law, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28)
121, 123-24, U.N. Doe. A/8028 (1970).
124 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 8, art. 7,
21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 50.
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1. The Right and States' Obligations
As pointed out previously, 125 the obligations imposed on statesparties in relation to rights under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights are qualitatively different. The former treaty guarantees
immediate recognition and enforcement of civil and political rights,
whereas the latter promises only that parties will take steps to
achieve progressively the enumerated economic, social and cultural
rights. ( Within the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights itself, moreover, greater importance is attached to certain
rights than to others, for in some articles it is stated that statesparties only recognize the right in question while in others statesparties both recognize and undertake to safeguard or achieve a
right.12 7 The obligation of states to recognize rights under the
Covenant is considerably less burdensome than the obligation im128
posed by an undertaking to safeguard those rights.
.That this distinction is relevant to the article 7 right to paid
holidays is made clear by the travaux prdparatoires. Article 7 provides only that states-parties recognize the right to just and favorable
work conditions, including paid holidays, but some representatives
in the Commission on Human Rights would have preferred wording
of a more binding quality. Thus, for example, the Soviet Union
proposed that parties to the Covenant be placed under an obligation to "guarantee" to each worker the right to rest and leisure. 2 9
The Soviet view was rejected, however, 130 notably because it was
feared that the imposition of too strong an obligation on states in
this area would endanger the "freedom of trade unions and employers to bargain for the best terms they could get in the prevailing
conditions." 131 Under article 7, therefore, parties to the Covenant
125 See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
126

See 21 U.N. GAOR, C. 3 (1397th mtg.) 117, U.N. Doe. A/C. 3/SR. 1397

(1966) (remarks of Mr. Lannung); Fawcett, The InternationalProtection of Human
Rights, in PoLrxcAxL THrORY AND TaE RIGHTS OF MAN 119, 127 (D. Raphael ed.
1967).
127

Compare art. 6 ("The States Parties .

.

. recognize the right to work ...

and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.") with art. 7 ("The States
Parties . .. recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable
conditions of work . . .").
128 Ferguson, The United Nations Human Rights Covenants: Problems of
Ratification and Implementation, 62 Am. Soc. -nr'r. L. Pnoc. 83, 95 (1968).
1297 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4 (219th mtg.) 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 219
(1951); id. (218th mtg.) 15, U.N. Doe. E/CN. 4/SR. 218.
(220th mtg.) 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 220.
131 Id. (219th mtg.) 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 219 (remarks of Miss Bowie).
130 Id.

But see 11 U.N. GAOR, C. 3 (713th mtg.) 161, U.N. Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 713 (1956)
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simply recognize an abstract right to the described conditions and
indicate at most that they will endeavor to achieve them. 32 In
view of the relatively light burden imposed on states-parties by
article 7, the question arises whether the United States should
ignore any policy-based objections to the right to paid holidays in
deciding whether to ratify the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.
For several reasons, this course of action should be rejected.
First, the United States is in as good a position as any nation to give
full effect to the rights enumerated in the Covenant because these
rights depend heavily on the economic development of the particular country. The United States would indeed be bound by the
Covenant to do more than just recognize the right to paid holidays,
because article 2 (1) 133 of the Covenant seems to impose on statesparties an independent obligation .34 to utilize up "to the maximum
of its available resources" to achieve the full realization of the right.
Furthermore, even if there is no such independent obligation under
article 2 (1), ratification by the United States would represent a
moral commitment to effectuate the rights in the Covenant. Finally,
as discussed below,:1 5 one of the policy objections to article 7 goes
precisely to the very designation of "periodic holidays with pay" as
a "right." Such objections cannot be dismissed simply because the
burden on states-parties under article 7 may be light. The policy
problems concerning the right to paid holidays must therefore be
considered.
2. Policy Objections
a. Of Rights and Ideals
A basic objection, stemming more from philosophical than
from practical considerations, relates to the designation of periodic
(remarks of Mr. Brema) (criticism based on desired freedom of employer-union

bargaining is unjustified since the very purpose of the Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights is to create supra-national law that would alter current state
practice).
32
See V. vAN DYxE, supra note 94, at 74. This description of states" obliga1
tions is applicable as well to the right to social security in article 9. See generally
7 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4 (221st mtg.) 14-22, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 221 (1951).
133 Article 2(1) reads as follows:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources,
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means ....
21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316.
134 See Fawcett, supra note 126, at 129.
1s See text accompanying notes 136-43 infra.
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holidays with pay as a right in any serious sense. In a larger context,
this objection may be seen as part of a theoretical debate over the
nature of fundamental rights of human beings. 138 In the limited
context of international law, the objection has focused on the practicability of immediate and effective implementation of various
rights by states that recognize them as such. Maurice Cranston is
the foremost proponent of the view that "a philosophically respectable concept of human rights has been muddied, obscured, and debilitated in recent years by an attempt to incorporate into it specific
rights of a different logical category." '17 According to Cranston,
such "rights" as those to unemployment insurance and to paid holidays provided by the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights differ fundamentally from the traditional rights to life,
liberty and due process. The latter clearly can, and because of
their nature should, be easily implemented by the state, which needs
only to refrain from taking arbitrary action and to adopt certain
procedural safeguards in order to assure those rights to its people. 13 8
By contrast, it is impossible to translate economic, social and cultural "rights" into true positive rights, enjoyed by and fully assured
to everyone, because factors beyond the effective control of the
state, such as the uncertainty of economic conditions, are crucial to
their achievement. Cranston asserts in conclusion that "[i]f it is
impossible for a thing to be done, it is absurd to claim it as a
right." 13'
Cranston's philosophical distinctions are not without practical
significance. Too free a use of the term "right" in the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights may cheapen the concept in
other applications. By attaching the label "right" both to traditional human rights and to economic ideals, 140 the Covenant may
136 See, e.g., Midgley, Natural Law and Fundamental Rights, 21 Am. J. Jurus.

144 (1976); Faust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of
Guarantee, 60 CoRNEYL L.Q. 231 (1975); Comment, Toward Creating a Philosophy
of Fundamental Human Rights, 6 COLUm. HuMaw PRiHTs L. REv. 473 (1974-75).
Discussion of this larger debate is, of course, outside the scope of this Comment.
137 Cranston, Human Right, Real and Supposed, in PomTrcAL TEoRY A ,
THE RiGn-rs oF MAN 43 (D. Raphael ed. 1967).
138 Id. 50.
139

Id.

As support for this conclusion by way of analogy, Cranston points to

the common law rule that a person could not be said to have a duty unless it were
possible for him to perform its functions. Id. See V. vu, D=xE, supra note 94,
at 63.
Cranston also suggests that a test of "paramount importance" should be utilized
in defining human rights. Under such a test, something can be said to be a human
right only if depriving people of it amounts to a "grave affront to justice." Cranston,

supra note 137, at 51-52.
140 By "ideal" is meant "something one can aim at, but cannot by definition
immediately realize." Cranston, supra note 137, at 53.
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foster the attitude on the part of some states that the traditional
rights are to be regarded in the same light as the new economic
rights; that is, as matters in the "twilight world of utopian aspiration." 141 The declaration in the Covenant of a right to periodic
holidays with pay is a prime example of the elevation of "ideals" to
the status of "rights." One commentator has observed: "[I]f the
definition of right is made to encompass not only what is immediately realizable but [also] what it ought to be a goal of policy
to promote, then the naming of rights becomes a political matter
," 142 The travaux prdparatoiresof the Covenant on Economic,
...
Social and Cultural Rights are full of examples of attempts by
various states to have employment provisions reflect certain political
viewpoints.1 43 In light of this fact, the United States should
scrutinize those provisions especially carefully before deciding on
ratification. If, after all, the Covenant represents nothing more
than a political "free-for-all," it is probably best avoided.
b. Inflexibility
It may be argued that the article 7 right to periodic holidays
with pay, as well as such provisions as the right to social security
in article 9, would introduce such inflexibility into the handling
of economic matters in the United States that the Covenant should
be rejected. 144 This inflexibility could impede both governmental
and private responses to economic crises, because the rights in
question affect employment relations in the private sector at the
same time that they impose some degree of obligation on governments. Clearly, any such inability to deal flexibly with crisis situa141 Id. 52. After signing the Covenant on Civil and Political Bights and the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights at the United Nations, President
Carter himself lumped both Covenants together as "offering goals to be achieved"
in the way that the American Bill of Rights "set a lofty standard for liberty and
equality." N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1977, at A2, col. 5 (emphasis supplied). Of course,
to the extent that provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights trace our
Constitution and Bill of Rights, they are immediately achievable and indeed guaranteed in the United States. The more novel rights of the Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights are ideals that are achievable sometime, if at all, in the
future.
142 V. vAx DYEx, supra note 94, at 63.
Cf. 11 U.N. GAOR, C. 3, I Annex (Agenda Item 31) 12 U.N.
143 See id.
Doe. A/C. 3/L. 556 (1956) (proposal by Soviet Union for cost of social insurance
to be borne by the state); 7 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4 (218th mtg.) 17, U.N. Doc.
E/CN. 4/SR. 218 (1951) (remarks of Mr. Kovalenko) (provision guaranteeing
economic rights would be in accord with constitutional provision of Ukrainian
S.S.R.).
144 Cf.

Haight, supra note 96, at 101 (despite importance of work to the

individual, it is inappropriate to attempt to establish it as a legal norm by
international legislation).
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tions is undesirable. Rather, a maximum degree of flexibility in
the economic arena is to be sought after for both government and
the private sector, as the circumstances which gave rise to a
statutory right to social security in the United States so well
145
demonstrate.
The drafters of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights anticipated the need for flexibility and arrived at formulations designed to preserve that value. Thus, although certain
representatives argued for wording that would lock states-parties
into a guarantee of particularly described rights, 146 the preference
was for more general descriptions with inherent flexibility.14 7 The

concern about flexibility was especially pronounced in the debate
over an article on social security, in which it was pointed out that
"the concept of social security was continually developing and a
rigid definition could only have a limiting effect." 148 States were
optimally to be left to determine the system of social security best
suited to their needs. 149 The general phrasing of article 9 was
therefore adopted. 50 Similar concern for flexibility may have
motivated the American representative to say, in another context,
that it was "not appropriate to specify in a covenant on human
rights the forms which international co-operation might take." 151
This is the atmosphere in which article 7, with its "recognition" of
the right to periodic paid holidays, was drafted. Therefore, objections to article 7 based on the inflexibility it imposes on government do not provide a reasonable ground for opposing the ratification of the Covenant. The right to paid holidays, and other
14 5 See 79 CONG. REc. 7783 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Norris); id. 13679-80
(remarks of Mr. Beiter).

146 See, e.g., 7 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4 (219th mtg.) 13, U.N. Doe. E/CN. 4/SR.
219 (1951) (Soviet Union). The right to periodic paid holidays was given content
by its proponents. The Uruguayan representative stated that he "wanted workers
to be given consecutive holidays of not less than two weeks' duration at least once
a year ......
11 U.N. GAOB, C. 3 (716th mtg.) 177, U.N. Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 716
(1956).
1417 See 11 U.N. GAOR, C. 3 (713th mtg.) 158-59, U.N. Doe. A/C. 3/SR. 713
Article 2(1) of the
(1956) (remarks by Dutch and Chilean representatives).
Covenant, with its reference to "available resources," embodies this view to some
extent. See note 133 supra.
148 11 U.N. GAOR, 1 Annexes (Agenda Item 31) 12., U.N. Doe. A/3525

(1957).
149Id. See 7 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4 (221st mtg.) 17, U.N. Doe. E/CN. 4/SR.
221 (1951) (remarks of Azmi Bey).
150 Article 9 reads simply: "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance." 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
15121 U.N. GAOR, C. 3 (1455th mtg.) 477, U.N. Doe. A/C. 3/SR. 1455
(1966) (emphasis supplied).
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economic provisions in articles 6-9 of the Covenant, simply were
not intended to set a rigid standard for states-parties to follow.
c. The Possibility of a CounterproductiveEffect
Yet a third argument against the recognition of a right to
periodic paid holidays is that, although formulated to advance the
laudable goal of improving human welfare, it may ultimately prove
counterproductive to that goal. The argument is that full enforcement and enjoyment of rights such as those embodied in article 7
require substantial investments of capital and resources. These
resources are relatively scarce in countries with underdeveloped
economies. A program of full enforcement might cause a diversion
of the needed resources from development programs in order to
secure immediate welfare goals, or increase unemployment as employers find the cost of labor too high under the circumstances.
Either result is contrary to the general goals of economic welfare
that formed the basis for the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in the first place, because both development and
employment are economically beneficial. The right to paid holidays and similar entitlements imposing high costs for immediate
152
welfare gains may therefore be counterproductive in the long run.
Primary support for this view comes from domestic studies that
show some correlation between the implementation of minimum
wage laws and an increase in unemployment. 153 Moreover, a study
by the International Labour Office of the United Nations 'r5 found
that significant negative effects attached to the imposition of a
minimum wage in developing countries. The study showed not
only that adverse effects on employment can normally be expected
when a minimum wage program is implemented, 55 but also that
there are negative effects on economic development due to (1)
higher costs of production and higher prices; (2) diversion of
52
See generally INTERNATIONAL LABouR OFFIcE, M MfnrI VAGE FrNG
AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1968).
153 See, e.g., _EXGISLAIVE REFERENCE SERVICE (Lm. oF CoNG.), ImPACt OF
WAGE INCREASEs ENACTED nv 1961, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1966);
MiNmtt
WAGE UNDER TE
M. ZAmr, A STUDY OF Tm EFFEcTs OF TEX $1.25 MINIMaU
A requirement of paid holiCANADA LABOUR (STA.NmA.Ds) CODE 73-85 (1970).

days, capable of imposing great costs on employers, is analogous to a minimum
wage in terms of possible effects on employment, investment, and so on.
154 NTERNATIONAL LABoUR OFFICE, supra note 152.
Cf. 7 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4 (Communications Received) 5-6,
'55 Id. 137-38.
U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/CR. 20 (1951) (concerning proposal for covenant that "[t]he
work of women ... be strictly regulated in order to ensure their protection," letter
from Open Door International protests that such special measures "are prejudicial
to those to whom they apply by actually lowering their possibilities of employment,
salaries and economic position.").
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resources from investment to consumption; and (3) intensification
of balance-of-payments difficulties, due to increased prices of
products for sale abroad and increased demand for imports of consumer goods. 156 Possible factors to offset these negative effects were
157
deemed to be generally lacking in developing countries.
A related point on the possible counterproductivity of rights
listed in article 7 pertains to what may variously be called the
"demonstration effect" or "revolution of rising expectations" produced by the recognition of such rights. W. D. Verwey has shown
how, during the process of economic development in the Third
World
we may sooner or later . . . expect set-backs in one or
more economic sectors, both because of the sudden character of economic growth and the limited amount of resources. . . . Any deterioration then may provoke sharp
reactions, since people can not afford a set-back. Inflation
and depression create general unrest and may bring to the
fore conflicts that in better times might have been eiaded,
because contending parties are then temporarily more satis58
fied. Political instability is the result.'
Verwey himself cites article 11 of the Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights as "a regulation of great polemological
importance," 159 because the "continuous improvement of living
conditions" there recognized as a right would entail a great risk of
k,
social instability upon setback.
Similarly, the simple recognition of the rights contained in
article 7 or similar articles could by hypothesis result in increased
social and political instability, even if particular states-parties were
undergoing no actual current improvement subject to disappointing
setback. To the extent that a declaration of the existence of such
rights, accomplished by solemn adherence to the Covenant by ali
156 INTERNATIONAL

LA&oun

OFFICE,

supra note 152, at 136-37. See M. FMED-

Cf. CommnssloN or
MONEY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 59 (1973).
INQUIRY INTO NATIONAL PoLicY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOIVfC RELATIONS, INTEranNATIONAL ECONOMIc RELATIONS 33 (1934) (danger of unemployment and slowMAN,

down in exports in American industries operating at high comparative cost).

These factors
157 INTERNATIONAL LA.oUR OFFICE, supra note 152, at 136-37.
include an increase in demand and an increase in productivity of employees inducect
by higher wages.
158 W.D. VERWEY, ECONOMC DEVELOPMENT, PEACE, AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW 87 (1972).

As examples of this "setback effect", Verwey points to the wave-

of revolutions that swept colonial areas in the depression of 1929 and to his own
studies showing a strong correlation between the frequency of military coups in
Latin America and years of decline in both per capita GNP and value of worlct
export. Id. 87-88.

159 Id. 89.
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nations great and small, increases worldwide expectations for improvement in standards of living and conditions of employment, 160
surely the frustration of existing imperfect conditions would be
intensified. In this sense, then, accession to the Covenant by a
nation as important as the United States may actually increase the
incidence of social unrest in the world. The foregoing discussion
indicates that the possibility of a counterproductive effect resulting
from provisions such as the right to paid holidays is not illusory.
This possibility, rooted in the strain that article 7 type rights
would place on the fragile economies of developing countries, 6 '
has a bearing on American ratification of the Covenant because, to
the extent that conditions falling short of general welfare goals in
other countries produce or aggravate international tensions, 162 the
United States has a concrete interest in the establishment of realistic
goals.
The possibility of counterproductive effect of the "periodic
holidays with pay" provision thus seems great. Moreover, there is
a real question as to whether the "right" to periodic paid holidays
fits in with a proper philosophical concept of rights from an American policy viewpoint. These considerations combine to suggest
that article 7 of the Covenant is unacceptable to the United States.
Furthermore, to the extent that these criticisms can be made of
other provisions of the Covenant (and it would appear from a casual
review that this is likely) the entire Covenant becomes unattractive
on policy grounds. With this in mind, it will be necessary to
examine each provision of the Covenant before making a decision
on ratification. Continued repetition of the problems raised by
article 7 would justify rejection of the Covenant.
C. The Meaning of Racial Discrimination
Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination defines "racial discrimination" as
'

0

See Luard, Conclusions in THE IN=RNATioNAL PnOTEcnToN OF HurMr.

RiGHTs 304, 316 (E. Luard ed. 1967) (desirable standards of achievement for
nations, such as the right to social security, "may come to be regarded, because of
the demonstration effect of western welfare states elsewhere and the revolution of
expectations that results, as something like minima" to which all are entitled without
condition).
101 It may be assumed, without altering this argument, that effective implementation of rights such as those established by article 7 would not adversely affect
the economy of the United States.
162See, e.g., W.D. VERwE Y, supra note 158, at 252-54 (19729); Fawcett,
supra note 126, at 118.
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any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based
on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life. 163
Article 2 goes on to commit states-parties to "[undertaking] to
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of
eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms . . ," 64
1. The Interest of the United States
There already exists a wideranging law designed to eradicate
racial discrimination in this country. 1 5 The United States, however, still has an interest in the exact meaning of "racial discrimination" as used in the Convention on Racial Discrimination, for
certain matters of American domestic policy embodied in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 could be affected by it upon ratification. In
particular, if "racial discrimination" encompasses the actions of a
bona fide private club in excluding certain persons on the basis of
race, then the Convention would operate to nullify 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a (e), which creates an exception to the equal access provisions 166 of the Act for any "private club or other establishment not
in fact open to the public." 167
The precise legislative rationale for the private club exception
is uncertain. On the one hand, the exception may have a twosided constitutional underpinning: first, that the first amendment
right of free association or the right of privacy requires such an
exception; 168 and second, that the commerce power, which is gen0 9 is
erally invoked as the basis for federal legislation in this area,
660 U.N.T.S. at 216.
Id. 216-18.
165 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-h (1970).
16642 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a)-(d) (1970).
167 There is in turn an exception to the private club exception, which brings
a bona fide private club within the mandate of the Act "to the extent that the
facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of
an establishment" otherwise subject to the equal access provisions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a(e) (1970).
168 See H.R. Ra,'. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2495 (views of Rep. McCulloch, et al.). See also
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (freedom of association);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy).
169 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
Cf. S. REP,. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2355, 2363-64, quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877)
163

164
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not applicable to truly private establishments that presumably do
not figure in people's interstate travel plans.170 On the other hand,
some members of Congress may have felt the private club exception
to be wise as a matter of policy, under a view that strictly private
places should be able to manage their affairs without governmental
interference even though this may not be constitutionally required. 17' In any case, good reasons for the exception exist. A
treaty that would abolish, upon implementation, the private club
exception in American law should therefore be rejected.
This concern is not relieved by the terms of article 1, which
speaks of racial discrimination as action impairing the enjoyment
of certain rights and freedoms in "any ...

field of public life."

172

Although initially this formulation seems to embody some sort of
state action requirement, it is evident from the travaux prdparatoires that no such limited scope for the definition of racial discrimination was intended. 73 Moreover, more than one commentator has implied that the Convention's prohibitions reach the
activities of private clubs. 7 4 There is also evidence that at least
one present state-party to the Convention construes it to cover such
clubs. 175 In light of this uncertainty regarding the full scope of
("[wihen, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an
interest, he in effect, grants to the public an interest in the use, and must submit
to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest
he has thus created.").
170 The fact that there are some bona fide private clubs which practice racially
exclusionary policies should not contribute, as such, to the "nagging uncertainty of
locating a decent place to eat or sleep" which is so inhibitive of the free flow of
interstate commerce. See H.R. RE'. No. 914 (Part 2), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9,
reprinted in [1964] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2495-2501 (views of Rep.
McCulloch). It is, rather, the inability to gain access to public accommodations
(surely outnumbering truly private clubs) which would create such "commerciallydestructive" uncertainty.
171 Senator Humphrey, during the debates over Title H, expressed his judgment
that "there should [not] be a Federal law which provides that a private club should
be managed this way, or managed that way." 110 CONG. REc. 6008, 6534 (1964).
172 660 U.N.T.S. at 216 (emphasis supplied).
173 See text accompanying notes 176-78 infra.
174See Elkind, Discrimination: A Guide for the Fact Finder (International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination),32 U. Prrr.
L. RE . 307 (1971); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Protection of Respect and
Human Rights: Freedom of Choice and World Public Order, 24 Am. U.L. REv.
919 (1975).
175 In 1971, Panama complained to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination that the United States was following discriminatory policies in the
Canal Zone. It was alleged in particular that the Panamanians' "right of access to
any place or service" was being violated, and that "[sichools, shops, cinemas, hotels,
clubs, services and so on, were segregated." 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 14,
U.N. Doc. A/8418 (1971) (emphasis supplied). The Committee decided that it
was not competent to look into the complaint, because the United States was not
a party to the Convention on Racial Discrimination. The Committee did, however,
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forbidden racial discrimination under the Convention, it is necessary to examine the background of the Convention in order to
determine finally whether it presents a conflict with American
policy in this regard.
2. The Travaux and Other Sources
The use of the term "public life" in the definition of racial
discrimination does not mean that there must be action by the
state, direct or indirect, in order for the provisions of the Convention on Racial Discrimination to come into play. The definition,
as contemplated by various bodies of the U.N., goes beyond the
American constitutional idea of state action. In initially calling
upon the Economic and Social Council to draft a convention on
the subject, the Third Committee of the General Assembly cited
resolution 1510, in which the Assembly had condemned "all manifestations and practices of racial, religious and national hatred in
the political, economic, social, educational and cultural spheres of
the life of society." 17" Although this sort of formulation, centering
on manifestations of racial discrimination or superiority, was not
embodied in the Convention as ultimately adopted, article
2(l)(d) 17 demonstrates that the Convention reaches not only state
action or inaction but also "discrimination by any person, group or
organization."
The ostensibly restrictive phrase "public life"
should not then be construed so as to mean state action; it would
appear rather to be "a generic summation of all rights protectable
by law, designed to be all inclusive in reach." 178
There still remains the question whether the definition of
racial discrimination is so broad as to encompass the action of a
bona fide private club in excluding individuals on the basis of race.
officially take note of the information that "certain forms of racial discrimination

have been and are being systematically practised" in the Canal Zone, and referred
the matter to the General Assembly. Id. 18.
170 17 U.N. GAOR, 2 Annexes (Agenda Item 48) Report of Third Comm. 2,
U.N. Doe. A/5305 (1962)

(emphasis supplied).

See 36 U.N. ESCOR, Social

Comm. (472d mtg.) 6, U.N. Doe. E/AC. 7/SR. 472 (1963)

Handl)

(remarks of Mr.

("All manifestations of racial discrimination should be prohibited by

law ....").

177Axticle 2(1)(d) reads as follows: "Each State Party shall prohibit and
bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by
circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization." 660
U.N.T.S. at 218 (emphasis supplied).

178 McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 174, at 1067.

ViERDAG,

Tam

CONCEPT OF DiscRmmqTiON

IN INTmNATIONAL

See also E.W.

L w

108 (1973)

(Convention on Racial Discrimination "is restricted, according to its purpose, to

race and related grounds, but covers in principle the entire legal order of a State-'

party").
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Some commentators, pointing to the nature of certain rights guaranteed to all by the Convention regardless of race, have stressed
how completely the Convention was intended to affect interpersonal
relationships.17 9 Article 5, for example, prohibits discrimination
in the enjoyment of assorted civil and economic rights, including
the "right to marriage and choice of spouse," the "right to inherit,"
and the "right to equal participation in cultural activities." 180
Combined with the state's obligation under 2(l)(d) to prohibit
racial discrimination "by any persons, group or organization," these
provisions seemingly entail extensive interference by the state with
purely private relationships. From this it could be inferred that,
under the Convention, states can and should forbid discrimination
in such settings as bona fide private clubs.' 81
This argument ignores, however, several factors that are crucial
to a proper delineation of the scope of the Convention. First,
article 5(f) provides for nondiscriminatory enjoyment of the "right
of access to any place or service intended for use by the general
public, such as transport, hotels, restaurants, cafes, theatres and
parks." 182 Certainly the specific mention of a prohibition against
racial discrimination in places open to the public creates a strong
presumption against the idea that any such prohibition was intended for purely private establishments left unmentioned in the
Convention. The doctrine expressio unius est exclusio alterius is
often invoked in statutory interpretation, 183 and the Convention
drafters could easily have avoided misinterpretation stemming from
'79 E.g., Elkind, supra note 174, at 332; McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra
note 174, at 1967; Schwelb, supra note 59, at 1005-06. But see Schroth & Mueller,
supra note 15, at 183.
180 660 U.N.T.S. at 220, 222.
181 See Elkind, supra note 174, at 330-32. Elkind proposes a "life chances"
test for discerning whether there is impermissible racial discrimination in a society.

The test would include such questions as: "Are public facilities available to all
and unsegregated?
supplied).

Are private clubs and organizations?" Id. 330 (emphasis

-182660 U.N.T.S. at 222 (emphasis supplied). This provision is comparable
in effect to the general equal access sections in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. See 42 U.S.C. §§2000a(a) & (b) (1970).
See, e.g., Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 316 (1903).
The representative of Italy, at a drafting session of the Sub-Commission on
183

the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, made an interesting observation concerning the reach of the Convention:

[I]t would be useful to specify the particularaspects of social life in which
the State might be called upon to intervene in order to prevent discrimination. One should envisage . ..employment, education, personal safety,
enjoyment of property, access to the courts, access to facilities intended for
use by the public, etc.

16 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4/Sub. 2 (408th mtg.) 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/
SR. 408 (1964) (remarks of Mr. Capotorti) (emphasis supplied).

920

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12.6:886

that doctrine by a simple addition of words if their intent had been
to include non-public places within the ban.
Second, the racial discrimination banned by article 2(l)(d)
carries an inbuilt limitation to areas of "public life." 184 Although
that term does not import a state action requirement, 8 5 it must
mean something that is logically to be distinguished from a private
sphere of life. 8 6 The proper distinction should be precisely the
one embodied in the civil rights law of the United States: "private"
property may be regulated by the government only "when used in
a manner to make it of public consequence, and to affect the community at large." 187 In the United States, privately-owned accommodations for eating or lodging meet this test if opened to the
public, but truly private clubs do not. 88 The personal rights
enumerated in article 5 of the Convention do not by their nature
contradict this interpretation of the public-life/private-life distinction. 8 9
Finally, the travaux priparatoiresseem to negate any implication that the drafters intended to prohibit racially exclusive private
clubs; indeed, the travaux tend to support a public-life/private-life
distinction such as that proposed above. 190 In the early discussions
8 4
1 See 16 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4/Sub. 2 (412th mtg.) 13, U.N. Doe. E/CN. 4/
Sub. 2/ SR. 412 (1964) (remarks of Mr. Ingles).
185 See text accompanying notes 176-78 supra.
186 Cf. Advisory Opinion on Competence of the General Assembly Regarding
Admission to the United Nations, [1950] I.C.J. 4, 8 (in treaty interpretation, the
natural and ordinary meaning of words in their context is controlling unless the
result is ambiguous or unreasonable). But see Elkind, supra note 60, at 317, which
suggests that the term "public life," initially proposed by the Soviet Union, was
not meant to be restrictive of the definition of racial discrimination. Because the
state controls so many aspects of life in a socialist economy, there would from the
Soviet viewpoint be little restriction on the reach of the Convention under such a
definition. The fact remains, however, that the "public life" phrasing was adopted
with the concurrence of many non-socialist nations and so it cannot be said that
the term as adopted admits of no opposing concept of "private life."
187 S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1964] U.S. ConE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2355, 2363, quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877)
(emphasis supplied).
-18 S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CoDE.
CoNG. & AD. NEws 2355, 2376.
189 Although the article 5 rights undoubtedly concern matters that are personal
in nature, it cannot seriously be contended that they were meant to affect all
private affairs that formerly were thought to be free from state interference. Thus,
it is hard to believe that the prohibition against racial discrimination in the enjoyment of the "right to marriage and choice of spouse" means that race is an impermissible factor in making personal decisions on marriage. See Elkind, supra
note 174, at 320. Rather, this particular provision of article 5 should be taken to
mean that the law itself is to remain wholly neutral in the area of marriage and
choice of spouse. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (racially-restrictive
covenants may not be enforced by courts pursuant to state common law policy).
100 See text accompanying notes 186-89 supra.
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of a subcommittee of the Commission on Human Rights, for example, the representative of India stated that "[w]hile it might be
difficult to wipe out racial discrimination in private relationships,
States must be obliged [under the proposed Convention] to prevent
it in public and semi-public activities." 191 The Italian representative too, although taking "an uncompromising stand forbidding
States to commit any act tainted with discrimination," favored a
more flexible approach where private individuals were concerned. 192
One exchange in particular reveals the understanding of the
drafters concerning the exact scope of "racial discrimination" in
the Convention. At one point, the representative of the United
States told of
one field in which he was profoundly convinced the State
should not intervene, and that was the private lives of individuals. . . . [O]nly the moral persuasion of the government, the influence of the norms set forth in the [Universal
Declaration of Human Rights] and the education of public
opinion should be relied on in the attempt to abolish dis193
crimination in that field ....
The representative of the Phillipines noted his sympathy with the
American's ideas, but indicated that any fears along those lines were
baseless because the "private lives of individuals" were beyond the
definition of racial discrimination already adopted in the Convention. 194
Although the point is not totally free from doubt, it appears
from the above considerations that the prohibitions of the Convention on Racial Discrimination do not cover the racially-exclusive
policies of bona fide private clubs. The drafters' intent as revealed
by the travaux prdparatoires,the exclusive mention in article 5(f)
of places open "for use by the general public," and the need to give
some real meaning to the term "public life" in article 1, all combine to support this conclusion. There is therefore likely to be
191 16 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4/Sub. 2 (407th mtg.) 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/
Sub. 2/SR. 407 (1964) (remarks of Mr. Krishnaswami) (emphasis supplied). The
"private relationships" in this statement might be analogized to the interpersonal
dealings of members of private clubs, whereas public and semi-public activities
might respectively be actual state action and places open to the general public.
192 Id. (412th mtg.) 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/SR. 412 (remarks of
Mr. Capotorti).
193 Id. 13 (remarks of Mr. Abram).
194Id. (remarks of Mr. Ingles).
The definition to which the Fillipino representative was referring was substantially similar to the present definition in article 1.
See 20 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4 (Report of Sub. 2) 21-23, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/873
(1964).
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no conflict in this regard between the Convention and the policy
embodied in the private club exception to Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
D. The Meaning of Genocide

Under article I of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, genocide is declared to be a
,crime under international law which states-parties "undertake to
prevent and to punish." Article II defines genocide as
any of the following acts committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 195
The Convention on Genocide, being as focused in subject
matter as it is, offers the fewest grounds of any of the internadonal
human rights treaties for policy objections. In the years immediately after World War II, the United Nations urgently perceived
the need to "liberate mankind from such an odious scourge" 196 as
was represented by Hitler's "Final Solution":
Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire
human gToups ....

such denial ...

shocks the conscience

of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form
of cultural and other contributions represented by these
to moral law and the spirit and aims
groups, and is contrary 197
of the United Nations.
195 Convention on Genocide, supra note 10, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.

Id. Preamble f13, 78 U.N.T.S. at 278.
197 4 U.N. ESCOR, Note by Secretary-General 1, U.N. Doc. E/330 (1947)
(quoting draft resolution of Sixth Committee adopted Dec. 11, 1946). See
Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, [1951] I.C.J. 15,
23.
198
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Accordingly, the General Assembly called for the drafting of a
convention to prevent the recurrence of genocide on any scale,19 8
and in fact one was adopted within a relatively short period of
time. Despite these laudable purposes, the Convention has been
criticized to some extent for the vagueness of its definition of genocide and for the resultant possibility for political abuse. 199 Moreover, it has been objected that the drafters, far from holding to a
narrow view of the crime as represented by Hitler's systematic
massacre, "saw fit to write into the Genocide Convention 'civil
rights' ideas, such as inflicting 'mental harm' on a group 'in whole
or in part.' " 200
In this connection, the United States has a general interest in
treaty wording that is reasonably clear and in forestalling facile
claims by domestic dissidents or foreign powers that it has committed crimes under international law. These interests are not,
however, unduly impinged upon by the Convention on Genocide.
The article II definition of genocide is not overly vague, at least no
more so than many other treaties and statutes that are currently in
force in the United States without great controversy. The definition uses terms such as "intent," "killing" and "serious bodily
harm," which for the most part have common meaning from experience or logic. 201 Furthermore, although any group or country
could accuse the United States of violations under the Convention
to further their own political ends, such accusations are not likely
to be taken seriously by the world community because of the probable lack of any intent on the part of the United States to destroy
human groups as such. Finally, undue significance should not be
attached to the term "mental harm" in the article II definition.
Its
meaning could be appropriately refined bY reservation 202 upon
American accession to the Convention. Fears concerning the Convention's "civil rights" connotations are further allayed by the fact
that the drafters rejected a notion of "cultural genocide," such as
198 4 U.N. ESCOR, Note by Secretary-General 2, U.N. Doc. E/330 (1947).
199 See V. vAN DYKE, supra note 94, at 11-12.
200 L. Somnr & T. BumzcENimAL, INTERNAmONAL PRoTEoN oF HuMAN
PeIHTS 930 (1973) (quoting an objection made by the chairman of the A.B.A.
Committee on Peace and Law through the United Nations, in his statement at the
1950 hearings on the Convention on Genocide held by a subcommittee of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee).
201 With respect to terms that are vague by any standard, an understanding
may be used to explain their meaning from the viewpoint of the United States.
See text accompanying notes 213-15 infra.
202
See text accompanying note 216 infra.
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the forced closing down of museums or newspapers of a particular
cultural group, 20 3 in arriving at the Convention in its final form.
Ratification of the Convention on Genocide is supported by
basic moral considerations that call for the prevention of a second
Holocaust. The asserted interests of the United States in refraining
from ratification are insignificant. No policy objection should
therefore keep the United States from becoming at long last a party
to the Convention.
IV. TnE USE OF RESERVATIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS
Assuming that the United States desires to ratify one or more
of the human rights treaties, any lingering objections or ambiguities
of a relatively minor nature need not stand in the way. It is well
recognized in treaty law that a state may, by the use of a reservation,
accede to a treaty but only on the condition that a particular section
of that treaty shall not apply to the reserving state or shall apply
only in certain circumstances. 20 4 Although the old rule was that a
state could not actually become a treaty party unless its reservation
was unanimously accepted by other parties, 205 that rule has been
altered significantly in the context of multilateral human rights
treaties by the Advisory Opinion on Reservations to'the Convention on Genocide.206 In that opinion, the International Court of
Justice held that, because the Convention on Genocide was intended to be "universal in scope" with as many states adopting it
as possible,2 07 objections to a reservation should not prevent the
reserving state from becoming a party vis-h-vis non-objecting statesparties, provided that the reservation was "compatible with the
object and purpose of the Convention." 208 This rule is applicable
as well to the other human rights treaties, because there is ample
203 See, e.g., 7 U.N. ESCOR (218th mtg.) 703, 706-07, & 719, U.N. Doc.
E/SR. 218 (1948) (remarks of Australian, Canadian and Brazilian representatives).
2 04
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FonEIN RELATIONS LAW OF =H UNTED
STATES § 124 & Comment a (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. See also
LEECi, supra note 28, at 949-50; Starr, supra note 5, at 873; Note, The United
Nations Covenants on Human Rights and the Domestic Law of the United States,
48 B.U. L. REV. 106, 117 n.66 (1968).
205
LMECHr, supra note 28, at 950.

206 [1951] I.C.J. 15.
207 Id. 24.
208 Id. 29.

This is the rule embodied in article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is the product of the General Assembly's
invitation to the International Law Commission to deal in treaty form with the

various problems of interpretation of international agreements.

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.

39/27 at 289 (opened for signature May 23, 1969). The Vienna Convention is
not yet in force and the United States is not a signatory to it.
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evidence of the drafters' intent to secure the widest possible adher209
ence to them.
Reservations have already been used extensively in relation to
the human rights treaties. Upon acceding to the Convention on
Racial Discrimination, for example the Soviet Union refused to
recognize the force of article 22, which gives the International Court
of Justice compulsory jurisdiction over disputes between statesparties. 210 Similarly, the United Kingdom, Austria and France
among others have made reservations concerning the degree to
which freedoms of opinion and expression may be suppressed under
the Convention on Racial Discrimination.21 1 The United States
too, on signing the Convention on Racial Discrimination in 1966,
warned that the following reservation would be essential to full
ratification:
The Constitution of the United States contains provisions for the protection of individual rights, such as the
right of free speech, and nothing in the Convention shall
be deemed to require or to authorize legislation or other
action by the United States of America incompatible with
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States
212

Clarification of the meaning of particular sections of a treaty
can also be accomplished by a unilateral statement of understanding on the part of a state that is acceding to the treaty. Such an
understanding differs from a reservation in that an understanding
is merely an interpretative statement that lends greater precision
to the section in question, without changing its legal effect; a reservation is actually intended to alter the legal effect of a section v/s-a209 See, e.g., 16 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4/Sub. 2 (412th mtg.) 12, U.N. Doc.
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/SR. 412 (1964) (remarks of Mr. Capotorti concerning Convention
on Racial Discrimination); 11 U.N. GAOR, C. 3 (713th mtg.) 158-59, U.N. Doc.
A/C. 3/SR. 713 (1956) (remarks of Mr. Boersma concerning Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights); 7 U.N. ESCOR, CN. 4 (221st mtg.) 14, U.N.
Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 221 (1951) (remarks of Mr. Eustathiades concerning Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
supra note 200, at 861.
210L. SoHw & T. BuNmTmHA
211

Id.

21221 U.N. GAOR, Note by Secretary-General 2, U.N. Doc. A/6405 Add. 1
(1966). See id., C. 3 (1455th mtg.) 478, U.N. Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 1455 (remarks
of Mrs. Harris) (article 20 of Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not
obligate states to prohibit expression of ideas when there is no danger of imminent
violence); InternationalProtection of Human Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Int'l Organizations and Movements of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 242-43 (1973) (statement of Ms. Hauser).
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vis the reserving state. 213 An understanding in this sense is not
subject to formal objection by other states that may render it inoperative, although a particular state may find the interpretation
embodied in an understanding to be so objectionable that it will
refuse to ratify the treaty or will make a reservation contradicting
the understanding.214 Furthermore, an understanding as such does
not have a binding international legal effect; rather, it preserves
the position of the ratifying state in the event that actual interpretation is later called for in an international adjudication. 21 5
Reservations and understandings could of course be useful in
resolving policy objections to a treaty, as well as in addressing constitutional problems. Thus, taking again the treaty sections focused
on in part III of this Comment, the following statements, adopted
by the Senate in conjunction with the ratification of the treaties,
might be advisable in order to clarify both the American interpretation of the treaties and the conditions of ratification by this country:
Covenant on Civil and Political Right: "Nothing in this Covenant shall be taken to mean that the United States recognizes or
will grant a right of self-determination to national, ethnic or other
minorities located within the national boundaries of the United
States. The right of the United States to protect its integrity as a
national, political unit is preserved."
Convention on Racial Discrimination: "The provisions of this
Convention requiring states-parties to take steps to eliminate racial
discrimination in private relations shall in no case be deemed to
reach private clubs or other establishments not in fact open to the
public, which are within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (e) ."
Convention on Genocide: "This ratification is made with the
understanding that 'mental harm' in article II (b) of the Convention is to mean 'permanent impairment of mental faculties.' " 216
These proposals are more in the nature of understandings than
of reservations, because they merely clarify particular treaty provisions in a manner consistent with the travaux prdparatoiresand do
not purport to alter the legal effect of those provisions. As understandings, therefore, they cannot be negated simply by the objec213

1PSTATEMENT, supra note 204, § 124, Comment c.

See Bitker, supra note

20, at 287-88.
214

RESTATEMNENT, supra note 204, § 124, Comment c.

215 See id. For the interpretative role that a unilateral statement of understanding may play internationally, see id. § 147(1) (e).
216 This was the reservation recommended by the Nixon Administration when
it tried, briefly and unsuccessfully, to have the Convention on Genocide ratified by
supra note 200, at 971-72.
the Senate in 1970-71. L. SouN & T. BuacENTHAx,
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tions of other states-parties to the treaties. 21 7 Even assuming that
the proposals are to be judged as reservations, there is no reason
why they would be rejected as "incompatible with the object and
purpose"218 of the treaties, thereby rendering ineffective any
American ratification based on them. They seem well within the
2 19
range of reservation so far displayed and tolerated in practice.
The first and third statements merely spell out the meaning of
certain treaty terms as understood by the United States and these
meanings are not clearly inconsistent with the drafters' intentions.
Moreover, though the proposed statement accompanying the Convention on Racial Discrimination would have more far-reaching, substantive effect, the Convention is the only human rights
treaty that has a provision actually dealing with reservations;
the two-thirds majority required to reject a reservation under
its article 20 is "a most unlikely possibility in a world in which any
formal protest against any reservation to any treaty is a rare
event." 220
As for the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
a proposal for reservation applicable to its article 7 is not made
here precisely because of the compatibility standard used to judge
the validity of such reservations. As noted above,2 21 the policy
arguments against the right to periodic holidays with pay concern
the wisdom of recognizing such a right at all, and are relevant to
many other provisions of the Covenant. Surely a reservation by
the United States that purported to deny the existence or binding
effect of such economic rights would have to be rejected as clearly
incompatible with the purposes of a treaty designed primarily to
secure those rights. 2m Rather than trying to ratify behind the
217

See text accompanying note 214 supra.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 at
art. 19 (opened for signature May 23, 1969). See generally Advisory Opinion on
Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, [1951] LC.J. 15, 29.
219
See text accompanying notes 210-11 supra.
220 Schroth & Mueller, supra note 15, at 195.
221 See text accompanying notes 136-43, 152-62 supra.
.222 There is one other doctrine of the law of treaties that is possibly relevant
to the question whether the United States should ratify the Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. It is generally said that a fundamental change in the
circumstances that surrounded the making of a treaty may be adequate grounds for
terminating, withdrawing from or suspending a treaty. E.g., B. I-GIcn s, supra
note 99, at 344-46; IEcH, supra note 28, at 988. The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties codifies and refines this rule, known as rebus sic stantibus, in
article 62, which provides that the doctrine applies only if (1) the change of circumstances was not foreseen by the parties; (2) the existence of those circumstances was an essential basis for the consent of the parties to the treaty; (3) the'
change results in a radical transformation of national obligations under the treaty;
and (4) the change was not caused by a breach on the part of the party invoking
2 18
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shield of an ultimately ineffective reservation, the United States
should study the objections to various provisions of the Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that are suggested above
and should ratify or not depending on how the policy considerations balance out in the end.
V. CONCLUSION

Against the background of a new emphasis placed by the Carter
Administration on human rights in American foreign policy, this
Comment has considered the advisability of American ratification of
four international human rights treaties. In particular, one provision from each of the four treaties has been assessed in the light of
possible policy objections. It has been concluded that the United
States has no valid objection on policy grounds to the provisions
singled out in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Conventions on Racial Discrimination and Genocide. The right
of self-determination contained in the first treaty has been shown
to offer no threat to the United States' interest in its national integrity. The definition of racial discrimination contained'in the
second treaty is not so broad that it would require elimination of
the private club exception to Title II of the Civil Rights 'Act of
1964. The description of forbidden genocide in the third treaty is
specific enough, and the disavowal of a notion of cultural genocide
clear enough, that the United States need not fear an intolerable
amount of politically motivated abuse of the treaty's provisions. In
any event, appropriate reservations or understandings in connection with each of the three treaties could safeguard American interests in this regard.
The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights presents a different case. There is a substantial question as to whether
the concept of rights embodied in this treaty is appropriate. The
the doctrine. U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 39/27, art. 62 (opened for signature May 23,
1969). It could be argued that the United States may safely ratify the Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and, in the event of some economic crisis
that may render its obligations unduly burdensome, rely on rebus sic stantibus as
a means of escaping those obligations. This putative safety valve is unsatisfactory
as a basis for ratifying the Covenant, for two reasons. First, it does not answer
the basic objections to characterizing many of the Covenant's provisions as. rights
in the first place. See text accompanying notes 162-63 supra. Second, the evidence
is that rebus sic stantibus has never successfully been invoked as grounds for
withdrawing from a treaty, and the emphasis is on a highly restrictive application
of the concept. See R. Hiccis, supra note 99, at 344; LEECH, supra note 28, at
988; Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances (Rebus Sic Stantibus), 61
AM. J. Ihq'L L. 895 (1967); Reports of the International Law Commision, 61
AMt. J. INr'L L. 248, 428-29 (1967). The protection afforded by the doctrine may
therefore be illusory.
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recognition of such rights might do irreparable damage to a philosophically respectable concept of rights, endangering the full enforcement of more fundamental and attainable rights. An attempt
to realize many of the rights recognized in the Covenant might also
be counterproductive to economic development. What is needed
in any ratification hearing is an in-depth assessment of these various
considerations. Given the similarity of many of the treaty provisions to the right to paid holidays in article 7, however, it is suggested that this Covenant is the least attractive candidate for
ratification.
This Comment has not attempted a comprehensive study of the
policy arguments against the human rights treaties. Nor is the
serious attention given to selected objections meant to suggest that
the United States should retreat from international human rights
concerns into a neo-isolationism that is inappropriate in an increasingly interdependent world. Rather, it is hoped that the analysis
undertaken here will be a helpful beginning to the full assessment
that must take place before sensible ratification or sensible rejection
can occur.

